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Do Students Expect Compensation for Wage Risk?
*
 
We use a unique data set about the wage distribution that Swiss students expect for 
themselves ex ante, deriving parametric and non-parametric measures to capture expected 
wage risk. These wage risk measures are unfettered by heterogeneity which handicapped 
the use of actual market wage dispersion as risk measure in earlier studies. Students in our 
sample anticipate that the market provides compensation for risk, as has been established 
with Risk Augmented Mincer earnings equations estimated on market data: higher wage risk 
for educational groups is associated with higher mean wages. With observations on risk as 
expected by students we find compensation at similar elasticities as observed in market data. 
The results are robust to different specifications and estimation models. 
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at Harvard. 1 Introduction
What do potential students know about the ﬁnancial consequences when they decide on their
education? What about the uncertainty about their potential wages? Are they aware of it,
is there variation between individuals? Do they expect compensation for the risk in future
earnings just as the stock market is known to present a trade-oﬀ between returns and risk?
Individuals’ choices on education are inevitably made under conditions of uncertainty, and
thus expectations on consequences are essential input in the decision process. Yet about
expectations we know very little. Only a handful of studies use information from questionnaires
asking for individuals’ expected mean or median wages that would ensue after some speciﬁed
schooling (e.g., Kodde 1986; Betts 1996; Wolter and Zbinden 2001; Nicholson 2002; Webbink
and Hartog 2004; Brunello et al. 2004). Dominitz and Manski (1996) extended this approach
with eliciting information on the uncertainty of expected incomes.1
Although it is an obvious way to start research on the nature, relevance and impact of indi-
viduals’ expectations, Friedman’s methodology of instrumentalism seems to have precluded
widespread adoption of the obvious approach (Friedman 1953).2 The common method in em-
pirical work is to treat expectations as unobserved variables and model the way individuals
are supposed to extract the relevant input from information that is available to the researcher
(including the possible ﬁltering eﬀect of self-selection).
In this paper, we will use the direct approach and analyse data obtained from students on
the expected consequences of schooling choices. As one of the advantages of this approach
we may note that it solves the problem of the counterfactual in a natural way: beneﬁts from
schooling options that are not chosen are not measured indirectly by construction, but simply
by asking what individuals would expect.
Standard human capital theory assumes that students take into account the expected (dis-
counted) lifetime income of diﬀerent educational and occupational pathways when deciding
about their education and occupation. However, if students are risk averse, the decision will
not only be based on the expected value of lifetime income proﬁles, but also on the risk that
is associated with each pathway. While this has been acknowledged at least since the early
1 Zafar (2007) used probabilistic questions on abilities and work preferences, and used this information to
explain choice of college major.
2 Manski (2004) assesses the status of direct measurement of individuals’ expectations and discusses examples
of relevant use.
2seventies (see Weiss 1972, and Levhari and Weiss 1974), the empirical literature dealing with
wage risk is still scant, although interest is growing.3 In our analysis of expectations, we will
pay particular attention to the earnings risk that is associated with schooling choices. We will
also investigate to what extent individuals’ expectations reﬂect compensation for earnings risk.
A small literature, exempliﬁed by Hartog (2007), claims that wage levels for given education
and occupation include a compensation for the risk emanating from imperfect predictabil-
ity of wages at the time that individuals have to make their education-occupation investment
choices. Wages are indeed higher in occupations-educations where wage variance is higher and
lower in occupations-educations where skewness is higher: people dislike risk but appreciate
favourable odds of very high wages relative to very low wages (“skewness aﬀection”).
A main criticism addressed at this approach is that the variance in the distribution of wages
for a given education may not be a valid proxy for the ex ante wage risk faced by the agents.
The observed distribution will also reﬂect heterogeneity and may be twisted and truncated
by selectivity as individuals act on their private information. To tackle these problems, we
will turn directly to the individuals themselves and ask about the wage distributions they
expect under diﬀerent age-education scenarios. By deﬁnition, students’ individual wage risk
expectations are not distorted by heterogeneity, as might be the case with aggregate wage risk
measures derived from market data. Applying the methodology developed by Dominitz and
Manski (1996) to Swiss students, we construct ex ante measures of wage risk and skewness.
Expectations data are particularly suited for the question at hand, since market compensation
for wage risk has to be imposed by supply reactions: without suﬃcient compensation, students
will not enter a speciﬁc education. For wage risk compensation to materialise students should
be aware of risk and evaluate wages in view of that risk; in other words, risk compensation
should be found in expectation data, in much the same way as stock market investors antici-
pate higher returns for more risky assets. In this paper we contribute to the small empirical
literature on uncertainty in schooling decisions by testing awareness of compensation for earn-
ings risk. We ﬁnd that students expect signiﬁcant wage risks and that higher expected wage
risk is associated with higher expected mean wages.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains how we measure expected wage dis-
3 For a survey of the literature and the diﬀerent approaches used, see also the Special Issue of Labour
Economics, December 2007, on Education and Risk.
3tribution parameters and presents the data. Section 3 tests the hypothesis of expected risk
compensation applying earnings regressions to expectation data and Section 4 concludes.
2 Calculating risk and skewness from wage expectation data
2.1 How to elicit wage expectations?
Dominitz and Manski (1996) did pioneer work in eliciting wage expectations of students. While
there exists a literature using mean or median wage expectations, Dominitz and Manski asked
students not only to state their expected median wage under diﬀerent, speciﬁed age-education
scenarios, but asked for additional information on the expected wage distribution. With this
information, they were able to ﬁt log-normal wage distributions for every student and every
scenario. Their sample consisted of 110 US students who were surveyed via computer-assisted
self-administered interviews.
Dominitz and Manski (1996) mainly focus on discussing the methodology of the survey and
on providing evidence that the expectation data is informative and reliable. This is done by
considering the internal consistency of the answers, the prevalence of response patterns, and
the comments made by respondents in a debrieﬁng session. Dominitz and Manski conclude
from their analyses that “respondents are willing and able to respond meaningfully to questions
eliciting their earnings expectations in probabilistic form” (Dominitz and Manski 1996, p.1).
The data used in the present study was gathered with computer-assisted interviews similar to
those used by Dominitz and Manski. The survey was administered to four successive cohorts,
1998 to 2001, of students in the Economics Department of the University of Applied Sciences
in Berne. 252 students were surveyed in their ﬁrst semester.4
First, students were asked to give their expected median wage for a speciﬁed age/education
scenario. Then wage distribution information for this scenario was gathered by deﬁning wage
values 20 percent below and 20 percent above the median stated by each respondent. These
values were rounded to multiples of 500 Swiss francs, to prevent confronting students with
odd and distracting values. The students had to state their perceived probability that they
will earn at most 80 percent of the median and at least 120 percent of the median respectively.
Thus, one has three points of the individual expected wage distribution for which the wage
4 Wolter (2000) describes the software used for the survey in more detail. We used the same software here,
but with a new sample of students. The exact phrasing of the questions can be found in Appendix B.
4value and the position in the probability distribution are known. This procedure has been
used for a total of ten diﬀerent scenarios which vary age and education for own expectations
and for perceived actual market wages.
The computer software provided the respondents with information needed to understand the
probability questions (e.g., deﬁnition of the median) and checked the answers in real-time for
missing or inconsistent values. The software also oﬀered interactive help in case of errors.
Furthermore, information about personal characteristics was gathered, such as gender, age,
parents’ education, parents’ social class and grades in secondary school. Finally, students were
asked to express their agreement with diﬀerent normative statements.
Our sample has some major advantages. First, the sample size (although limited) is more
than double that of comparable studies in the past. Second, the sampling was restricted
to a well deﬁned and homogenous group of students, limiting the risk that inter-individual
diﬀerences would be driven too much by institutional or individual background variables.
Third, there are no problems related to selectivity of participation. All students in all classes
at the University of Applied Sciences participated in the survey (during class hours). Last but
not least, the data is of higher quality than the data from written surveys. Item non-response
or implausible answers are almost inexistent, thanks to the real-time plausibility checks of the
software. Thus, hardly any observations drop out of the estimations. This rules out another
important potential source for selection bias.
2.2 Operationalization of risk and skewness
As described in section 2.1, the students were asked to give information on probabilities for
each of the intervals deﬁned by the values corresponding to 80 percent of the median, the
median, and 120 percent of the median. We will use this wage distribution information from
four scenarios: (1) “wage expectation conditional on being of age 30 and having achieved sec-
ondary education as highest education”, i.e., leaving the University of Applied Sciences now,5
(2) “expectation conditional on age 40 and having achieved secondary education as highest
education”, (3) “expectation conditional on age 30 and having achieved tertiary education”
and (4) “expectation conditional on age 40 and having achieved tertiary education”.
The information we got from the students does not fully identify the underlying wage distri-
5 The vast majority of students has completed a commercial apprenticeship (Berufslehre) on upper secondary
level (ISCED 3B) before entering the University of Applied Sciences.
5butions. By assuming a speciﬁc distribution function, we can retrieve its deﬁning parameters
and calculate any moment of the distribution, such as variance and skewness. Enforcing a
certain distribution comes, however, at a cost: Every distribution has its own features which
limit the way students’ expectations can be represented. Fitting a log-normal distribution,
as Dominitz and Manski (1996) and Wolter (2000) do, imposes a heavy restriction on the set
of possible student expectations. The two-parameter log-normal distribution is, among other
features, always positively skewed.
It seems highly unlikely that all students should have such a distribution function in mind
for all the scenarios. This can easily be shown by looking at the share of distributions that
are positively skewed: only 62 percent of the 1008 distributions elicited are positively skewed.
Assuming a log-normal distribution is thus not precisely correct for roughly one third of the
individual distributions.
There is another reason why the assumption of log-normality seems too restrictive. Tsiang
(1972) shows that risk averse individuals appreciate positive skew. Hence, we would like to test
whether students do indeed expect compensation for wage risk and a subtraction for skewness
at the same time. The log-normal distribution does, however, not allow us to separate mean,
variance and skewness: it is fully described by the parameters mean and variance, so skew-
ness cannot vary independently from these parameters. Assuming log-normal distributions,
we implicitly assume that students do not distinguish between variance and skewness when
making expectations. Thus, we could not test whether positive skew is associated with a lower
expected mean wage, conditional on expected wage risk.
We will therefore not only ﬁt log-normal distributions6 to the wage distribution information
elicited from students and use the interquartile range (iqr) of these distributions as a measure
of risk. Instead, we will also specify alternative, non-parametric measures of variance and risk.
The three pieces of information we ask students about their expected wage distribution - the
median and the probabilities associated with one value below and one value above the median
6 We also ﬁtted Beta distributions instead of log-normal distributions. The literature (see McDonald 1984)
typically ﬁnds that the Beta distribution performs better than the log-normal distribution in ﬁtting wage
distributions since it entails two shape parameters (instead of one in case of the log-normal). Applying a
root mean squared error criterion, our Beta distributions perform worse, however, than the log-normal in
three of the four scenarios. The reason is that some students gave answers that indicate distributions that
are strongly skewed to the right. The log-transformation is well suited to deal with these cases, whereas the
Beta distribution parameters take on extreme values without providing a good ﬁt. The log-normal seems
to be the best parametric assumption available for our purpose, despite its shortcomings noted in the text.
6- can be used to deﬁne simple variance and skewness measures. The three points divide the
respective probability density function into four parts. We denote the probability masses lying
in the four intervals by A, B, C and D respectively:7
A = P(0  w < 0:8  m)
B = P(0:8  m  w < m)
C = P(m  w < 1:2m)
D = P(1:2  m  w < 1)
By deﬁnition of the median (m) we know that A+B = C +D = 0:5. Then a natural variance
measure is deﬁned by looking at the share of total probability that has been assigned to the
two outer parts of the distribution: v = A + D. This provides us with a non-parametric
variance coeﬃcient (not to be confounded with the “coeﬃcient of variation”) that lies between
0 and 1. In the same vein, a skewness coeﬃcient can be deﬁned by looking at the asymmetry
in the probabilities assigned to the two outer parts of the distribution: s = 2(D   A). This
coeﬃcient lies between  1 and 1; a positive sign indicates positive skewness and vice versa,
while 0 indicates a symmetric distribution.8;9 Figure 1 illustrates how students’ answers are
reﬂected by the various variance and skewness measures. It shows three hypothetical cases,
where every student expects a median wage of 5000 CHF and was thus asked for the probability
to earn less than 4000 or more than 6000 CHF. Student 1 expects lower wage risk than student
2, but both allocate probabilities symmetrically. By contrast, student 3 has the same wage
risk as student 2, but her expected wage distribution is positively skewed.
Our non-parametric measures seem intuitively appealing and less restrictive than assuming
log-normal distributions and deriving variance measures from them. It remains, however,
to be decided how the interval width around the median, i.e. the boundary between the
probability areas A and B and between C and D should be deﬁned. They can be deﬁned to be
7 Because of rounding to digestible values, the boundaries are not in all cases located at exactly 20% from
the median, so minor adjustments of the respective probabilities were necessary, see Appendix C.2.
8 Of course, the limited information available about the density functions does not allow us to identify higher
or lower variance and skewness unambiguously. Implicitly, we are still making distributional assumptions.
9 Note that these deﬁnitions do not imply correlations between the variance coeﬃcient and skewness from
the presence of the same term in both (A and D), as a change in A must always imply a change in B, C





















































Figure 1: Three hypothetical wage distributions of students with expected median 5000 CHF
and ﬁtted variance and skewness measures
proportional to the median (i.e., 20% around the median), or as an interval with ﬁxed width
for all scenarios and persons. This depends on the type of risk aversion of students’ utility
functions.10 Risk averse students are indiﬀerent between receiving the expected value of the
(expected) wage distribution for sure and getting a draw from that wage distribution plus a
certain risk premium. If students exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, the risk premium
they expect for wage risk depends only on the variance, not on the expected value of the wage
distribution. In this case, a ﬁxed interval width independent of the median seems the best
choice as basis for the calculation of a variance coeﬃcient.
By contrast, if students exhibit constant relative risk aversion, they expect a risk premium
which is constant for risk that is proportional to their wealth, independent of their wealth
level. In other words, the risk premium is constant for the wage variance divided by the
expected value of the wage distribution. Deﬁning the variance coeﬃcient based on a variable
interval width growing and shrinking proportionally to the median seems more adequate in
this case.
We will use both speciﬁcations and compare the results. The relative interval width speciﬁca-
tion uses the interval deﬁned in the survey, i.e. 20% around the median, to determine the
10 For the following short discussion on risk aversion, we assume that students’ wealth is largely determined
by their life time income from work.
8probability masses A to D. The ﬁxed interval width speciﬁcation, however, implies that the
interval endpoints, and thus the probabilities A to D, have to be adapted for each observation,
in order to ensure that the same interval is used for everybody in every scenario. We used the
mean interval width in the pooled sample which deﬁnes the new interval endpoints at 1530.9
CHF above and below the respective median. The probability mass lying between the original
(relative) and the new endpoints was moved accordingly.11 This requires assuming a distri-
bution function. We have used the log-normal distribution again. After these adjustments,
the variance and skewness coeﬃcients as deﬁned above were computed for the ﬁxed interval
width speciﬁcation.
Although the proposed variance and skewness coeﬃcients do in principle not require the strong
assumption of log-normality, the ﬁxed interval speciﬁcation had to make use of this assumption
to a certain extent. Nonetheless, our alternative variance measures are quite diﬀerent from
using the interquartile ranges of the ﬁtted log-normal distributions. In addition, we are able
to calculate skewness measures and to assess skewness independently from variance.
2.3 Descriptives for risk and skewness measures
One may worry that the probabilistic information we draw from students is not “spontaneous”
information but is stamped and moulded by the nature of the questionnaire: the feedback in
the computer programme reduces misunderstanding by simply not allowing violation of basic
rules on probability. First, we may repeat that Dominitz and Manski (1996) focussed precisely
on this problem and that they concluded that the method yields meaningful information.
Second, we have kept track of interventions in cases where individuals speciﬁed a probability
above or below the median surpassing 50 percent. An individual has to specify 20 probabilities
for a total of 10 scenarios. He can thus potentially make 20 errors, although this would indicate
utter incomprehension, as intervention would never improve understanding. 65 percent of the
respondents never made any error, 20 percent made one error, 11 percent made two errors
and the remaining 4 percent made more than two errors (the worst was a single person with
7 errors). That does not seem to suggest that the answers depend critically on the error
11 For instance, if the interval relative to the median was wider than the ﬁxed interval, probability mass had
to be moved from B to A and from C to D. The adjustments for the ﬁxed interval width speciﬁcation were
as follows: in 2016 adjustments (252 students * 4 scenarios * 2 wage values around median), 41.4% of all
adjustments included changes of more than 5 percentage points. 7.7% entailed changes of more than 10
percentage points.
9correction: the data are basically obtained from a sample of respondents who did not need
more than a single reminder. Finally, we have used this information for a robustness check
and we found no indication of a serious ﬂaw in our results (see 3.2).
Figures 2 to 4 present the distributions of expected median wages as well as variance and
skewness coeﬃcients for the four scenarios. The distributions are based on the 252 cases in
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Figure 2: Distribution of median of students’ expected wage distributions
As Figure 2 shows, the distribution of medians for secondary education at age 30 is fairly
concentrated. The dispersion of expected medians across individuals increases with level of
education and with age. For tertiary education, at age 40, the distribution has a remarkably
long upper tail.
Figure 3 shows that distributions of the variance coeﬃcients are quite diﬀerent for the diﬀerent
scenarios. Variances are clearly higher for the scenarios at age 40 and for the tertiary education
scenarios. While the distribution of the variance coeﬃcient is strongly skewed for the scenario
age 30/secondary education, with hardly any values above 0.5, the distribution for scenario
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Figure 4: Distribution of skewness coeﬃcients of students’ expected wage distributions
11much more wage risk to the latter scenario than to the former.12
For skewness, the picture is less clear. The distributions of the skewness coeﬃcients seem a
bit broader for the scenarios with age 40, but actually, the dispersion of skewness coeﬃcients
is remarkably stable across scenarios; locations also vary modestly, with the lowest mean for
40/tertiary. To compare the scenarios in more detail one needs to consult the descriptive
statistics in the Appendix. The most interesting message of ﬁgure 4 is that expected skewness
varies considerably between individuals. An important share of the expected wage distribu-
tions is negatively skewed. Furthermore, skewness is only loosely correlated with variance:
Calculating the correlation of variance and skewness conditional on scenario dummies, skew-
ness has a marginally signiﬁcant positive correlation with variance. The partial correlation
is, however, very small (regression coeﬃcient 0.04). Most of the variance in skewness is not
driven by the variance (risk) of the underlying wage distributions. These ﬁndings conﬁrm that
log-normality is not a fully satisfactory approximation for all individual wage distributions.
We conclude that individuals’ anticipated wage distributions exhibit much variation, are not
always symmetric (nor symmetric in logs) and exhibit variation in skewness independent from
variation in the individuals’ anticipated variance.
3 Results: students expect compensation for wage risk
3.1 Core results
If workers are risk averse, they should be compensated for wage risk and a higher risk should
lead to a higher mean wage. Thus, one way to assess the importance of wage risk is to estimate
Mincer earnings equations including a measure of wage risk r and skewness s:
ln(wi) = Xix + rri + ssi + i (1)
In the literature (see Hartog and Vijverberg 2007 for an application), risk ri has been measured
12 Not surprisingly, the diﬀerences between the scenarios are smaller if one considers the variance coeﬃcient
based on a variable wage interval around the median (see descriptives in the Appendix). The risk in scenario
30/secondary education appears higher then, whereas it appears lower in scenario 40/tertiary education.
The ranking of scenarios remains the same, however, with the highest risk attached to scenario 40/tertiary
education.
12as the variance around the mean wage in the particular group to which individual i belongs,
i.e. education or occupation. The argument is that individuals build wage expectations
for alternative educations and occupations by just looking at the wage distributions they
observe on the labour market for the particular groups. The variance around the mean, within
schooling-education groups, is a measure of the individual’s ignorance, of the unpredictability
of wages and hence, of risk. Typically, the regression also contains a measure for the skewness
si of the wage distribution within the occupation/education group: just as expected wages for
some education should increase with the variance because individuals dislike risk, the expected
wages may be lowered for positive asymmetry in the distribution. Risk averse individuals
appreciate a long upper tail of the distribution as it gives them favourable odds of large gains
relative to large losses (Tsiang 1972), and they are willing to pay for it by accepting lower
wages, thus exhibiting skewness aﬀection. Diﬀerent authors (see King 1974; McGoldrick 1995;
McGoldrick and Robst 1996; Hartog and Vijverberg 2007 for the US, and Hartog et al. 2003
for Europe) have chosen the risk augmented Mincer approach and have found that mean
income in an occupation or education is positively related to the variance and negatively to
the skewness.13
Typically, the equation is estimated in two steps, with variance and skewness deﬁned on the
residuals (within occupations/educations) from an ordinary Mincer equation in the ﬁrst stage
and then added to a re-estimation in the second stage. The main criticism applying to this
approach is that ex post wage realizations are not a valid proxy for the ex ante wage risk ri
(and skewness si) faced by the agents (Cunha et al. 2005; Cunha and Heckman 2007). Only
part of the variance that can be found in actual wage data is due to risk, another part is
due to worker heterogeneity. Heterogeneity means that individuals have superior knowledge
compared to the researcher who looks at ex post data. Individuals would then not just look
at the average wages they observe on the labour market for diﬀerent groups. If individuals
have private information about their own ability and other productivity-related variables,
they form more informed expectations about where they will end up in the wage distribution.
Researchers who do not have this information would then overestimate individuals’ wage
risk when looking at the variance of ex post realizations of wages. Cunha et al. (2005) and
13 The mentioned papers did not analyze the case of Switzerland. We have replicated their work with data
of the Swiss Labour Force Survey and ﬁnd the same qualitative results as these authors: variance has a
negative sign, skewness a positive sign in a risk augmented Mincer earnings regression. Detailed results are
available from the authors.
13Cunha and Heckman (2007) promote this argument and present an econometric solution for
the problem. They develop and apply a method for decomposing cross section variability of
earnings into components that are forecastable at the time students decide to go to college
(heterogeneity) and components that are unforecastable (risk). Instead of reconstructing the
information set from observed behaviour, as Cunha and Heckman did, we will exploit the
direct observations on expectations, i.e. students’ own forecasts. In particular, we can see
if individuals’ expectations reﬂect the risk compensation by using the expected variance and
skewness measures in Mincer earnings equations. We will start with pooled results, i.e., the
data for 4 scenarios for each of 252 individuals has been combined, giving 1008 cases.
Table 1 shows OLS regression results for the dependent variable log median wage. Column
I shows a wage regression without risk and skewness measures. According to the scenario
dummies, students expect to earn 24 percent more at age 40 than at 30 if they would go
working immediately.14 Completing tertiary education, they think to earn 39 percent more at
age 30 than without tertiary education. At 40, they expect another 45 percent on top of that
when ﬁnishing tertiary education. Year dummies reﬂect the boom in 2000/2001. Men expect
somewhat higher wages than women. Higher wages for men and steeper age-wage proﬁles for
higher education are stylised facts that students are clearly aware of.
Diﬀerent risk and skewness measures are the variables of interest in the models II to VI. In
column II, this is the interquartile range derived from the ﬁtted log-normal wage distributions.
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on median wage, which mirrors the ﬁndings with data from
actual, ex post wage realizations. The mean expected eﬀect of risk on wages is substantial:
An increase in the interquartile range by 1,000 CHF is associated with an expected increase
of earnings by 4 percent. This result is of comparable magnitude to results in the US, where
McGoldrick (1995, p.221) found that “a $1,000 increase in the standard deviation of unsys-
tematic earnings [the risk measure; note from the authors] will increase men’s earnings by 2.5
percent and women’s earnings by 3.1 percent”.15
The inclusion of a risk measure increases the goodness of ﬁt of the estimation and has an
eﬀect on other coeﬃcients. The scenario dummy coeﬃcients are reduced in some speciﬁca-
tions, meaning that also the expected return on tertiary education becomes lower. In Hartog
14 The results on scenario dummies in the text refer to the exact percentage changes (i.e., e
^    1) instead of
the values approximated by the dummy coeﬃcients in the table.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15et al. (2003, table 1), the education variable remained unaﬀected by the risk and skewness
variables. Our diﬀering result could have important implications concerning the interpretation
of expected, ex ante rates of return to education, as part of the ex ante return may have to
be re-interpreted as risk compensation. However, this eﬀect depends on using ﬁxed or relative
interval width for calculating the variance coeﬃcient.
Column III presents the results for the variance coeﬃcient described in section 3.2 which is
used in place of the interquartile range in column II. Again, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive
eﬀect on the median wage. This eﬀect hardly changes when the skewness coeﬃcient is added
(column IV).
Adding controls for individual background (column V) does not inﬂuence the coeﬃcients for
either variance or skewness. Thus there are no spurious correlations or biases if omitted. An
increase in the variance coeﬃcient from 0 (which means that all probability mass has been
assigned to the interval plus/minus 1’530 CHF around the median) to 1 (the full probability
mass is assigned to the lower and upper end of the distribution16) is associated with a more
than 40 percent higher median wage. Although this calculation is based on the maximum
possible diﬀerence in variance, the order of magnitude shows that the eﬀect is substantial
even for smaller variance diﬀerences.
Column VI shows the results with the variance (and skewness) coeﬃcient deﬁned on an in-
terval width proportional to the median. The result is qualitatively the same, although the
coeﬃcients’ size as well as the goodness of ﬁt are reduced.
The skewness coeﬃcient shows a negative sign and is signiﬁcant in all models, though its eﬀect
is clearly weaker than that of risk. A higher skewness is associated with a lower median. As
discussed in the introduction to this section, this can be explained by students’ risk aversion
which implies skewness aﬀection.
Using expectation (i.e. ex ante) data, we can thus fully replicate the results of the literature
on risk augmented Mincer earnings equations which uses actual ex post wage data: expected
risk variables show a positive eﬀect, expected skewness variables a negative eﬀect on expected
median wage. In fact, we even get similar values for the elasticities. Multiplying the regression
coeﬃcient with the mean values of risk and skewness (0.285 and 0.137, respectively) we ﬁnd a
risk elasticity of 0.125 and a skewness elasticity of -0.010 (for ﬁxed interval width), values that
16 This case is theoretical and means an inﬁnite variance.
16are in the middle of the interval of values found in the empirical literature. The elasticities for
the case of variable interval width are lower (at 0.040 and -0.009, respectively), but still within
the range found for market wages (see Hartog 2007 for a summary of elasticities estimated on
market data).
3.2 Robustness checks
Diﬀerent objections might be raised against our interpretation of the results in table 1. We
will discuss the following three possible shortcomings in turn: a) the wage expectation data
might be unreliable, b) pooling across scenarios might hide heterogeneous results across the
scenarios, and c) there might exist unobserved heterogeneity across students that biases the
results.
a) Unreliable wage expectation data?
As pointed out in section 2.1, the expectation data is of high quality due to the computer
assisted interactive survey. Our software did, however, not only point out inconsistencies and
errors to respondents, it also traced these errors - which again, is an advantage over paper
and pencil survey data. We can therefore include variables for the number and type of errors
respondents have committed. These refer to misunderstandings of the concept of probability
and the median, i.e. stating probabilities higher than 100 percent or stating probabilities
higher than 50 percent for the parts of the distribution above or below the median. Including
this information on errors in the regressions of table 1 does not inﬂuence the results; neither
does the exclusion of the (small) share of people who committed several errors. Given the
high data quality, the plausible descriptive results of the survey and the stability of the results
using diﬀerent speciﬁcations in table 1, we are conﬁdent that our results are not an artefact
caused by unreliable data.
b) Does pooling obscure heterogeneity in scenarios?
Pooling the observations for four diﬀerent scenarios per person might hide heterogeneous
results for regressions run separately for every scenario. Four separate regressions all show the
same results for our variables of interest (positive sign for the variance coeﬃcient, negative for
the skewness coeﬃcient), however (not shown).
17c) Unobserved heterogeneity across students?
Although we control for diﬀerent individual characteristics in the regressions of table 1, there
might still exist student ﬁxed eﬀects, i.e. unobserved student characteristics that are correlated
with expected median as well as with expected risk and skewness.
Dep. var.: ln median wage
variance coeﬀ. (ﬁxed interv. width) 0:356
(0:030)
skewness coeﬀ. (ﬁxed interv. width)  0:054
(0:015)
variance coeﬀ. (relative interv. width) 0:120
(0:035)
skewness coeﬀ. (relative interv. width)  0:045
(0:016)
scenario age 40/secondary education 0:191 0:214
(0:009) (0:009)
scenario age 30/tertiary education 0:284 0:321
(0:009) (0:009)
scenario age 40/tertiary education 0:512 0:598
(0:012) (0:010)
Adj. R-squared 0:836 0:808
N 1008 1008
Signiﬁcance levels: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01;
Reference group: scenario age 30/secondary education
Table 2: Fixed eﬀects estimation of risk augmented earnings equations
Therefore, we estimated a ﬁxed eﬀects model where the students’ means over the four scenarios
have been subtracted from each variable. All variables that are ﬁxed for a student drop out of
the estimation. Table 2 therefore only includes scenario dummies in addition to the variance
and skewness coeﬃcients.
The results are in line with the results of the comparable models IV and VI in table 1, although
the coeﬃcients for variance and skewness are slightly reduced.
4 Conclusions
We have investigated students’ expectations on the beneﬁts of education, by using data from
direct questioning rather than deduced from imposed econometric modelling. This provides
us with individual ex ante wage risk measures that are not confounded with heterogeneity as
is the case with using group variances of actual market wages as a risk measure. Students
anticipate wage distributions with substantial variance and skewness: they are far removed
from anticipating a single wage for a particular schooling choice as assumed in the standard
human capital model. Although expected dispersion diﬀers widely between students, on aver-
18age students anticipate the variance to increase with age and to be higher with tertiary than
with secondary education. These expectations are in line with actual labour market data. We
further ﬁnd that students are aware of risk compensation, with implicit elasticities remark-
ably close to those actually observed in the labour market. Earnings uncertainty is thus an
important part of the uncertainty inherent in individuals’ educational decisions, with students
expecting a trade-oﬀ between risk and return as it is known from the stock market.
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part time study 0:099
father’s education high 0:071
father’s education middle 0:830
father’s education low 0:099
mother’s education high 0:032
mother’s education middle 0:357
mother’s education low 0:611
upper class 0:028
upper middle class 0:369
middle class 0:540
lower class 0:063
Second. school grade Frencha 4:88 0.435
Second. school grade Germana 4:97 0.368
Second. school grade Matha 4:80 0.639
aMaximum grade is 6, minimal passing grade is 4.
Table 3: Individual ﬁxed variables (no variance between scenarios)
age 30/secondary age 40/secondary age 30/tertiary age 40/tertiary
variable n scenario education education education education
mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std.
dev.
expected median 5294 842 6619 1228 7346 1220 9852 2209
wage (CHF)
interquartile range 1085 657 1532 905 1826 1131 2810 2316
(log-normal distrib.; CHF)
variance coeﬃcient 0.172 0.124 0.245 0.166 0.288 0.175 0.437 0.2
(ﬁxed interv. width)
variance coeﬃcient 0.263 0.159 0.289 0.163 0.301 0.166 0.342 0.171
(relative interv. width)
skewness coeﬃcient 0.176 0.283 0.137 0.291 0.152 0.254 0.083 0.279
(ﬁxed interv. width)
skewness coeﬃcient 0.189 0.289 0.141 0.296 0.154 0.254 0.099 0.282
(relative interv. width)
Table 4: Variables varying with scenarios
22B Phrasing of questions on wage expectations in the
questionnaire
The following questions on students’ own wage expectatios were introduced by a section ex-
plaining the meaning of probabilities and the median, and by specifying details about the
wages asked (per month, full-time equivalent, no inﬂation).
Scenario secondary education:
Imagine you stop studying now and do not start another education. Think about the kind
of occupations, industries, hierarchy levels etc. in which you will be working under these
conditions. What is the median amount of money that you think you will earn by the time
you are 30 (40) years old? What do you think is the probability that you will earn more than
X / less than Y? At age 30: ... / At age 40: ...
(Original German version: Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie brechen Ihr jetziges Studium ab und ab-
solvieren keine zusätzliche Ausbildung. Beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen, indem Sie sich
Berufe, Branchen, Hierarchiestufen etc. vorstellen, in denen Sie unter dieser Voraussetzung
arbeiten würden. Wie hoch schätzen Sie Ihren Medianlohn im Alter von 30 bzw. 40 Jahren
ein? Wie schätzen sie die Wahrscheinlichkeit ein, dass Ihr Lohn höher wäre als X / niedriger
wäre als Y? Mit 30 Jahren: ... / Mit 40 Jahren: ...)
Scenario tertiary education:
Imagine you have successfully ﬁnished your education at the University of Applied Sciences
before age 30. Think about the kind of occupations, industries, hierarchy levels etc. in which
you will be working under these conditions. What is the median amount of money that you
think you will earn by the time you are 30 (40) years old? What do you think is the probability
that you will earn more than X / less than Y? At age 30: ... / At age 40: ...
(Original German version: Stellen Sie sich vor, sie haben die Ausbildung an der Fachhochschule
vor dem 30.Lebensjahr absolviert. Beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen, indem Sie sich
Berufe, Branchen, Hierarchiestufen etc. vorstellen, in denen Sie unter diesen Umständen
arbeiten würden. Wie hoch schätzen Sie Ihren Medianlohn im Alter von 30 bzw. 40 Jahren
23ein? Wie schätzen sie die Wahrscheinlichkeit ein, dass Ihr Lohn höher wäre als X / niedriger
wäre als Y? Mit 30 Jahren: ... / Mit 40 Jahren: ...)
C Calculation details
C.1 Fitting log-normal distributions
The log-normal distribution is completely determined by two parameters, typically expressed
as the mean  and standard deviation  of the underlying normal distribution. The log of the
median m of the log-normal distribution equals  by deﬁnition of the log-normal distribution:
ln(m) = . The interquartile range iqr of the log-normal distribution can be calculated by
estimating . Since the median and two additional points of the wage distribution are known,




rearranging and substituting the known log wages for x and  gives:
ln(w)   ln(m) =    1(p)
We have two observations for w and p each, such that  can be estimated as the coeﬃcient
in an OLS with N=2 using the equation above (adding an error term at the right hand side).
With  at hand, the interquartile range of the ﬁtted log-normal distribution can be computed:
iqr = m  (ez:75   ez:25)
where z:75 =  1(0:75) =  z:25:
C.2 Probability adjustments due to rounding of the interval endpoints
In order to compare the measures between persons, the deﬁnition of the intervals containing
probabilities A to D has to be the same across persons. Because the values 0.8 times median
and 1.2 times median had been rounded oﬀ to the nearest 500, the interval deﬁned by these
values does not have a width of exactly 40 percent of the median. Moreover, the interval be-
24comes asymmetric depending on the median. For instance, a median of 6,100 results in a lower
value of 5,000 (instead of 6,100*0.8=4,880) and in an upper value of 7,500 (6,100*1.2=7,320).
Both values in this example have been rounded up.
We deﬁned new endpoints of the interval that are exactly 0.8 times median and 1.2 times me-
dian. Then, the probability mass lying between the original (rounded) and the new endpoints
had to be moved. In the example above, probability mass had to be moved from A to B and
from C to D in order to ﬁnd the probabilities associated with the values that equal exactly
80 percent and 120 percent of the median. This requires assuming a distribution function.
We have used the log-normal distribution again. The actual size of probability adjustments
(for the speciﬁcation using interval width relative to the individual median) was minor: in
2016 adjustments (252 students * 4 scenarios * 2 wage values around median), only 16 cases
occurred where more than 5 percentage points of probability had to be moved. After these
adjustments, the variance and skewness coeﬃcients presented in 2.2 have been computed.
25